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Protectionism, Disorder and All GATT
R.H. Green
There is a certain ambiguity - to put it tactfully - about 
much of the discussion on both the New International 
Economic Order and trade liberalisation. I am reminded of 
the last chapter in Emile Zola's Nana, where Nana - the 
sometime de luxe prostitute - is lying dying on a bed in a 
garrett and through her window come the shouts of jubilant 
marching crowds saying, "To Berlin, to Berlin". The point 
to recall is that this is the first day of the Franco-Prussian 
War which was to end with Prussian army encircling Paris!
If you look at the formal statements of the debate, apparently 
it is about progress towards a New International Economic 
Order. Whereas if you look at the situation, it's quite 
clear that what has been achieved since 1969 - not, I would 
stress, simply since 1973 - is a New International Economic 
Disorder, not a New International Economic Order. It is 
equally quite clear that what I will call, for lack of a 
better term, the core OECD economies are talking about is 
not preserving anything that now exists but recreating the 
"golden age" of '45-'70 that entered a terminal illness in 
the late 1960's and expired on the Smithsonian operating 
table in 1971. If one looks with a cold and calculating 
eye on '74-'79 changes I think it hard to claim that those 
conceivably in the direction of a New International Economic 
Order (as defined in the relevant UN Resolutions) outweigh
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those in the other direction. It is within the margin of 
error which changes are greater, quite apart from the general 
trend toward disorder which increasingly swamps both types 
of planned change.
In the second debate is trade liberalisation. In the 
Tokyo Round, on the face of it, one has a triumphal march 
toward trade liberalisation. All right, it has some odd 
grace notes of selective discrimination. True it is selective 
discrimination of a rather peculiar kind because it is not 
selective discrimination against the largest sources of 
imports causing damage. In that case the UK shoe and cutlery 
industries should be restricting Italy. And countries in 
general would be restricting Japan. That's not what is 
being talked about. The Newly Industrialized Countries 
(and any who would enter that group) are the target even 
though they account for 5 or 6% of world trade in manufactures.
There are these odd grace notes (or flats and sharps) and 
a certain faltering in the music. But the basic tune is 
"wider still and wider may free trade blow, spreading out 
in grandeur o're protections1 show" to the time of "Land of 
Hope and Glory".
The New Protectionism
That is a very odd theme song, because what one quite clearly 
has is the rise of a New Protectionism. One has the MFA.
One has the European Steel Cartel (Eurofer). One has the
United Kingdom engaging in overt protection and - granted 
not by tariffs as such - in subsidizing shipbuilding to 
a level at which the subsidy is sometimes greater than the 
wage bill. Indeed, one begins to wonder what kind of 
protection this is. It would be cheaper to pay the shipbuilding 
workers not to work thc*n to do this.
We see here a very virulent form of protectionism indeed.
It used to be a standard text book joke - or Eurocentric 
slur - that only developing countries achieved negative 
value added in manufacturing. I suggest that a large portion 
of the UK steel products industry has achieved precisely 
that point. At the same time one now sees a decision to 
engage in the mystification that structural change results 
primarily from trade. There are plenty of studies to show 
that 75-80% of the job loss comes from changes in demand and 
changes in technology and has nothing to do with trade and 
that of the balance at most one fifth - say 2-4% - bears 
any relation to Third World imports into OECD states. The 
proponents of "Bash the NICs, Save Britain" are engaged either 
in self delusion, mystification of others, rather nasty 
scapegoating or a desperate hope that if you clog up one 
sidechannel of a torrent you will avoid being swept away.
Even when successful in blocking imports,protectionism rarely 
does much to save jobs. Protection of the Dundee jute industry 
was successful in the sense that it blocked off imports and
also successful in the sense that all, or almost all, of the 
ex-jute milling companies in Dundee are now very successful 
companies. However, if one digs deeper, one discovers that 
90% of the jute jobs were lost creating an economic disaster 
area in Dundee. The purported reason for protection is not 
to ensure the permanent viability of manufacturers who are 
unwise enough to be stuck in a declining industry and who 
have forgotten to make any changes. The purported reason is 
to protect communities and jobs. Since a standard cited 
example of successful UK adjustment is Dundee, one is forced 
to inquire whether after the event people forget why they 
set out to protect or whether the protection of jobs and 
communities is a fake or facade and the real intended reason 
is to protect manufacturers and to hell with the jobs and 
the communities. In any case, one does little or nothing 
to save employment by this kind of measure.
And Its Trajectory
One then has another element. I view it as rather whimsical 
to suppose that the spread of restrictionism is going to 
be limited to the NICs. As I pointed out, their exports are 
a trivial part of the problem. Even though trade as a whole 
is a secondary part, it is a much larger part than NIC 
exports alone. Therefore I suggest that if the wave of 
protectionism is built up against NICs it will soon move 
to fellow OECD core economies - beginning with Japan. The
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New Protectionism is cancerous and I suspect, like cancer, 
it grows at an increasing rate if not cut out. What one 
is on the verge of, and indeed some of the statements from 
OECD Heads of Government suggest that they are well aware 
of this, is a collapse into general protectionism of the 
kind of the 1930's. Not necessarily an exact re-run - 
history is not so simple as that. But a Hobbesian trade 
"war of all against all" with "the devil take the hindmost" 
(presumptively the UK so far as the OECD core goes). It 
is hardly self-evident that the protectionism of the 1930's 
did anything for preserving employment in industrial economies 
nor for limiting social costs.
To make any progress in dialogue, let alone action/we 
must face two facts:
1. the fact that in respect of a New International
Economic Order we are going nowhere with an increasing
belief that either the core OECD economies can't
think of anything to propose or that they are 
deliberately negotiating in bad faith to eat up 
time. Not perhaps the best of backgrounds for 
reaching agreement on anything.
2. The fact that in respect to trade we are not talking 
at the moment about increasing access. In the 
specific context of Third World economies,we are 
talking about preventing the removal of access which 
legally has been available for many years but,now 
that it is about to be used,is suddenly snatched 
back.
A former negotiator for an OECD country once remarked that 
the basis of trade negotiations is to give the maximum 
concessions possible for those goods and to those countries, 
which one is absolutely sure cannot - over the relevant time 
period - make use of them and to include safeguard clauses 
to protect oneself if one has made a mistake. It's no 
use discussing the MFA, the call for "selective safeguards", 
or other manifestations of that trade negotiation strategy, 
as if one were engaged in a triumphal march toward free 
trade. One has to stop the rot first if one wants to have 
either a renewed march toward free trade or a march toward 
an international trade organisation which would manage 
trade in a legitimate sense of the word, as opposed to 
its present use as a codeword synonym for selective protection­
ism a la MFA.
We have to face the reality that we are in the middle of a 
growing New International Economic Disorder and of a virulent 
and rapidly growing New Protectionism. To change reality
7it is first necessary to comprehend it. To have a meaningful 
dialogue leading to relevant agreed action one must avoid 
self delusion and attempts to delude others about the nature 
of the present context, trend, and issues at stake. This 
GATT Round has been a mystification and a fc^rce because 
the real work on the trade front has been constructing 
the New Protectionism not dismantling the Old. Tokyo's 
real gains - e.g. on non-tariff barriers - are more than 
outweighed by its dangerous refusal to face the rise of 
protectionism, its causes and the possible short and medium 
term steps to halt and reverse it.
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What Is To Be Done?
As preface to a consideration of what might usefully be 
sought on the trade access frontflet me underline my
remark that a queer division of labour has developed. In
GATT one pretends to have a triumphal march to free trade 
and off in shadowy holes and comers one has restrictions 
growing more rapidly then GATT gets rid of them in the 
light of day. That is the road to a trade war not to 
free trade nor to any serious indicatively planned trade 
expansion.
I wish to explore eight relevant conditions and contentions 
as to what can be done in the short term:
First, the industrial capitalist world has employment and
balance of payments problems that are perfectly real.
They are going to continue or recur in the forseeable 
future. They inevitably give rise to pressures for 
restrictive trade practices. Second, it is not useful to 
argue whether forces leading to the New Protectionism 
constitute a good thing or a bad thing. Very few people 
would argue it to be a good thing. But it most certainly 
is a thing thing and we cannot argue that because it's 
a bad thing it will wander off and vanish in the 1980s.
Third because the large industrial surplus economies - 
e.g. Japan and Federal Germany - have the power to 
retaliate, the full weight of restrictionism is likely 
to fall first on the peripheral economies and particularly
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those which are a little less large (and therefore less 
able to retaliate by withdrawing markets) than Brazil 
and a bit less irrelevant to trade in manufactures then 
Upper Volta. In other words Brazil may be just within the 
margin of safety, Upper Volta is within the margin of 
being benignly neglected, but if you are the Philippines 
or Singapore or Hong Kong you are in the direct line of 
fire.
Ad Hoc Negotiations and Other Oddities
Fourth, the process of negotiating, imposing, enforcing 
the New Protectionism almost entirely outside GATT^ 
while preserving the illusion that there is a triumphal 
march to free trade within GATT, is a dangerous piece of 
self deception. This is only aggravated by now and again 
registering as a protocol to GATT something which violates 
every provision and principle of GATT like the MFA. 
Therefore I cannot share the Deputy Secretary General1s 
view that it's a good thing that the steel cartel talks 
are in OECD so GATT can keep its hands pure. I cannot 
advise GATT to play Pontius Pilate to the crucifiction 
of free trade.
Fifth, this type of ad hoc negotiation is peculiarly 
dangerous to the peripheral economies because it tends to 
pit them one at a time against EEC or the USA or Japan.
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But a very good case can be made that the peripheral 
economies (or the 77 or the Newly Industrialised Economies 
and other Third World economies or whatever phraseology 
one prefers) had better hang together because otherwise 
in the quite foreseeable future, at the least, any increase 
in their manufactured goods exports to the OECD core 
states is going to be hung separately by protectionist 
lynch mobs .in the industrial world. This is not quite 
the same as saying that no differentiation makes any 
sense, but it is to say that what the Big Three called 
differentiation in the Tokyo Round is pretty naked 
selective economic aggression. As a result,those aspects 
of differentiation which might make sense are suspect 
because differentiation has become the code word for
^  y\\ //divide the 77, knock out NICs export threat.
The sixth point is to argue that as the New Protectionism 
will not go away neither freer access nor even, without 
a great effort, maintenance of the access that legally 
already exists is likely to be achieved in the immediate 
future. To limit and contain present damage and halt 
future erosion of access it is critical to bring the orderly 
marketing, adjustment time, payments defence issues back 
within GATT and face them squarely in that forum. (Unless 
of course GATT wants to go out of business in favour of a 
new trade organisation that deals with actual problems.)
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Seventh, the obligations of the NIC, workably and honestly- 
defined, vis a vis industrial market economies, vis a vis 
each other and vis a vis the weaker peripheral economies 
do need some reconsideration and reformulation.
Eighth, so too do the responsibilities of, and the right 
of others to impose sanctions on, economies with structural 
visible plus invisible trade surpluses.
Routes Not Taken
Let me set out four assumptions I have not made. I am not 
working from a general theoretical or operational commitment 
to free trade. I am not a free trader by conviction or in 
terms of strategic option advice. In given situations 
tactical choice may be another matter.
Second, I am not operating on the basis that pure reason 
and equity overcome particular interests.
Nor do I suppose that the periphery has unlimited negotiating 
power. I think it has some negotiating power, if only 
because it is widely recognised that the maintenance of 
its growth of imports since 1973 has been a critical factor 
in there being only a long stagnation instead of a full 
scale recession in the centre. There is quite real bargaining 
power in pointing out that if you can't raise your exports 
you are going to have to cut your imports whether you want
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to or not and inquiring what will this do for employment 
and balance of payments in the centre. I stress this 
because while it is not true that a belief that you have 
power in negotiations is automatically self-fulfilling,
I think it fair to say that a belief that one is powerless 
in negotiations is automatically self-fulfilling. Thus 
it is better to start with a slight error toward believing 
one has more power in negotiations than is the case 
rather than to start with a major error in the other 
direction.
The third assumption not made is that legal form or 
institutional form can, by themselves, solve problems.
I would and do argue that inappropriate legal forms and 
the separation of the imposition of restrictionism from 
the main body of trade negotiations is an almost perfect 
example of inappropriate forms causing and preventing the 
solution of problems.
Fourth, I am not arguing that what is presented here 
is the sum total of changes needed in GATT. I am basically 
concerned to deal with what I consider to be a trend - 
the rise of the New Protectionism - which has to be stopped 
as a first step before one can make progress in the right 
direction.
t'*• >
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Cut Cartels; Go To GATT
The case against trying to deal with trade issues on a
single sector or product basis outside GATT^one by one 
without any general framework is threefold. First, 
single sector product arrangements are, by their nature, 
derrogations from what are theoretically vested GATT 
rights. When they are negotiated in isolation, outside 
GATT in no real framework, the real break is to have the 
agreement at all. Thereafter the tightening of the noose 
raises no new issues of principle and is, in practice, all 
too easy. Look at the successive versions of the MFA.
Its steady erosion from purported orderly management of 
rapid trade growth to draconic, detailed restrictions has 
become no matter of principle but simply a matter of 
marginal changes. If one had a set of rules and sanctions 
to enforce them within GATT then every renewal or every
alteration would be a matter of principle just as much as
the initial agreement. I don't say this would guarantee 
expanded access,but the present form seems to me to guarantee 
the opposite.
Second, case by case "orderly marketing" amounts to a 
State substitution of itself for, and/or of support for, 
private corporate cartels. The history of cartels makes 
pretty clear that they injure the weak (including, I 
would note, industrial economy labour) and freeze the 
status quo. That is not satisfactory from the periphery
■t
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point of view. Therefore cartel negotiation on steel 
is not perhaps the brightest of things for South Korea 
or Braz-il to get themselves involved in from their own 
point of view and is gravely damaging to the prospects of 
potential new Third World iron and steel exporters.
Third, any capitalist industrial economy, especially if it 
is a democracy, responds to a range of enterprises, interest 
groups and sub-classes. Some of these are basically free 
traders, some are protectionists, some (perhaps most) 
have rather more complex positions. If one is negotiating 
outside GATT on yams, textiles and garments the state 
is negotiating in a situation in which it is responding 
to only one set of groups, the protectionist ones. If one 
is interested in maintaining access#one would prefer to 
be in an institutional situation in which the First World 
State had to respond to its free trade as well as to its 
protectionist groups.
Toward A Suitable Article 19
There are various problems about using present GATT 
proceedures. Even if Article 19 were more often invoked, 
instead of creating things like the MFA, problems would 
remain. Both from the point of view of the invoker and 
from the point of view of the peripheral economy^Article 19 
is inadequate. It was not designed for the purpose of 
medium term access protection subject to specified limits 
and wouldn't serve very well. A total reconstruction of 
Article 19 might, however, give a framework:
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First/ clearer and tighter criteria are needed for 
establishing disruption. A clear and present probability 
of disruption in the immediate future justifying recourse 
to negotiated access management would also need to be 
defined. The heading off of a crisis is often easier 
than its resolution at a latter stage, but the definition 
must not be such as to allow generalized assertions of 
"potential harm" to be used as a new code word for 
generalized, selective protectionism.
Second/ provision for the limitations to relate only to 
country whose high share of rapid increases in import 
supplies were critical and not to others is reasonable 
and normally desireable to Third World sources. However, 
it does require applying that principle across the 
board even if it meant a fellow member of a preferential 
trade area (e.g. EEC) and even if it meant Japan or 
Federal Germany. In most cases the absolute increases, 
let alone shares of total imports, that are causing the 
major problems do not come from Third World countries. 
This is of course not "selectivity" as argued by OECD 
states at Tokyo - that was a code word for discrimination 
against low cost (code word "unfairly competitive") 
periphery exporters first, last and all the time.
Third, strict time limits (and non-renewability of these 
time limits) with predetermined phasing out should be 
required for all restrictive arrangements;
Fourth, initial quotas not to be lower then those in
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the twelve months preceding formal invocation of the 
article, and the growth in access to be at least 5% a year 
in quantity (or constant price) terms.
Fifth, a requirement is needed on the imposing state to 
negotiate a domestic adjustment transformation programme 
that would make the restrictions unnecessary - i.e. to 
require that a state which imposes trade restrictions of 
this kind to put together a negotiated and superviseable 
letter of intent somewhat analogous to the IMF borrowing 
situation.
Sixth, negotiated compensation, market access or cash 
for actual and reasonably projected export losses should 
be a required feature of all restriction agreements.
Seven, a ban on "voluntary quota" agreements outside GATT - 
i.e. making these grounds for GATT punitive action and 
certainly not providing that they may be registered as 
protocols to GATT.
Eight, provision of some type of independent arbitral 
capacity or a fact finding unit reporting to a Governing 
Board, to pass judgement on breakdowns in negotiation and 
on asserted violations.
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Ninth, some agreement - again in a sense parallel to an 
IMF letter of intent - with the GATT secretariat responsible 
for monitoring and reporting on performance.
And tenth, failure to reach negotiated agreement to give 
either party the right to invoke arbitration but not to 
impose restrictions unilaterally prior to the arbitral 
decision. (This means the arbitral proceedures would 
have to be moderately expeditious - certainly not running 
five years and subject to infinite delay by either party.
Possible Common Concerns
I do not suppose that all of these provisions could be 
achieved in one go. They certainly could not have been 
achieved in the dying moments of the Tokyo Round. But 
I think it necessary to warn also that they do not increase 
present formally existing access rights. What they would 
do is minimise the degree to which these rights will vanish 
as soon as someone tries to use them. The case to be made 
to the USA, Japan, EEC is that from the point of view of 
the industrial economies it is vital to stop the advance 
of the New Protectionism unless they want the present 
situation to move from stabbing other people (the NICs) 
in the back to stabbing each other in the back. Unless 
they want to loose the dynamism of their exports to the 
Third World countries they do in fact have an interest 
in reconstructing Article 19 to make restrictionism more 
genuinely a means to adjustment and not the first step
towards permanent protectionism. Unless they really want 
to be pressured by the restrictionist lobbies, and not 
trade ones as well, they have an interest in getting 
trade negotiations out of the commodity by commodity, 
cartel basis which may be vaguely convenient for negotiating 
against the peripheral economies but is not convenient 
for negotiating with each other^or for preserving either 
exports, price stability, or employment.
A second possible short term point is that GATT has at 
the moment no parallel, at least not one that anyone has 
invoked or is likely to invoke - to the scarce currency 
clause in the IMF. The IMF scarce currency clause has 
tended not to be invokeable so that it may seem an odd 
analogue. However, its limit is that the IMF at one and 
the same time would be invoking the scarce currency clause 
against an economy and trying to mobilise its scarce 
currency from its Government or the Group of 10 would do so 
parallel to IMF. In the context of GATT, if one could 
define structural surplus reasonably tightly - as I 
believe can be done and have spelled out in more detail 
elsewhere - a country which ran a structural surplus - 
a defined - could, in fact as well as theory, be declared 
to be a structural surplus state. It would be required 
to negotiate a solution with a group of the states in 
deficit with it. If it did not do so the structural 
surplus economy would be subject to revocation or limitation 
of its access.
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This would appear to be more workable in GATT than it is 
in the IMF. To tell Federal Germany or Japan that theirs 
are scárce currencies which cannot be freely used when the IMF 
and the Group of Ten seek them for IMF and
the GAB is a bit difficult. But GATT would not be trying 
to get anything. The gross structural imbalance in 
manufactured goods trade is that of Japan. It is deeply 
destabilizing. However, it came to be it now threatens 
the growth of global output, trade and employment. Whatever 
the Japanese may say^if they were faced with all countries 
in the world being able, under an existing formal proceedure, 
to raise their trade restrictions against Japan 50%, 
the Japanese might well decide that there was some point 
in ending a policy of benign, (or malign) neglect of 
the structural imbalances of her economy. Japan is today
the only country in the world which it is not prudent to
ask to increase its rate of growth of GDP because the
Japanese economy is so structured that an increase in the
rate of growth of GDP for Japan normally means an increase 
in its balance of payments surplus. Similarly the relative 
efficiency of export, domestic and import distribution 
(commerce) is a major form of non-tariff protection on 
which neither the state nor the private sector has chosen 
to act.
Selective Reciprocity
Two quite genuine issues arise here. To those of the NICs 
with substantial manufactured goods exports to core economic
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and remarkably high tariffs on precisely the same manufactured 
goods, I suggest that this type of policy is
unnecessarily inflamaatory. I do not believe that the 
Brazilian shoe industry would collapse if the duties 
were reduced from very high tariffs and import licensing 
restrictions were eased. The industry is competitive.
Further, that level of tariff on a major export gives 
rise to deep suspicions of dumping.
Secondjin any bargaining situation it is usually profitable 
to make some concrete offers. This is especially true 
if after calculating costs one finds that the other 
party views a particular potential offer as one of 
great value although as far as you can see the costs are 
not very high.
The real question is whether a workable and fair definition 
of an intermediate group of economies and the obligations 
of states can be agreed. Elsewhere, I have offered 
one tied to GDP per capita (say $1,500 at '78 prices), 
share of manufacturing in GDP (say 2 5%) , share of domestic 
manufactures in total exports (say 25%). I have offered 
it as a bargaining position toward a definition. I am a 
little dubious whether any economies other than Hong Kong 
and Singapore fall in to today. But I am not saying that 
the intermediate class should have no countries in it, 
should not grow over time or might not be defined somewhat 
differently.
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The intermediate class should: a) still be eligible
for GSP; b) be required to offer reciprical concessions 
to core economies and fellow intermediate economies on 
those particular manufactured goods in which an intermediate 
state had substantial exports to the core economies 
(and/or to fellow intermediate economies). (The goods 
would need to be defined sensibly e.g. one would have to 
say cricket equipment not sporting goods, sulphuric 
acid not non-organic chemicals, hand made leather shoes 
not footwear. But in cases like that it would appear 
that willingness to negotiate reciprocal concessions 
would a) be prudent and b) not self evidently damaging)* 
c) be required to give the same concessions as core 
economies to peripheral economies.
The question of economic relations among Third World 
economies is not primarily a GATT issue, or at least 
should not be. Primarily one needs an enabling clause 
so that intra periphery trade groupings don't constantly 
require GATT waivers or wierd pretences that what is 
being done is taking the first step toward forming a free 
trade area. Once such a general waiver/enabling clause 
is adopted, more semi or non-reciprocal arrangements 
should be negotiated in ad hoc, regional or global Third 
World contexts. First World support is needed to change 
the GATT rules. The arguments are that if EEC is - in
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practice - not a GATT affair there is no case why - e.g. - 
a Southern African Economic Coordination Zone should be. 
Further at the present and for the forseeable future 
North-South trade is limited by South exports to the 
North. South-South trade will not reduce N-S trade but 
increase total South trade (S-S plus N-S). Therefore, it 
is not a direct threat to North trade albeit it would, 
by increasing options and reducing structural imbalances, 
erode centre hegemony.
A Glace Further Ahead
So far I have been talking about what needs to be done 
rather urgently. From the point of view of the industrial 
economies the goal is to prevent the collapse of a system 
of relatively freer trade than has existed for any 
previous 30 year period about their ears. From the 
peripheral economies' viewpoint the goal is to preserve 
as much as possible of the access that they legally 
have at the moment and thereby preserve the possibility 
of raising manufactured and processed exports to the 
core OECD economies.
In a slightly longer term peripheral economies must 
consider how they can operate in GATT. On my estimate.
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it takes 20 or 30 full-time professionals to play the 
"GATT game". US government internal studies show that the 
USA has had an average of 160 professionals working on the 
Tokyo Round full-time since 1973. Doubtless the US is 
bigger and concerned with more particular products; but 
this is an area in which there are economies of scale.
The number of peripheral economies that can devote even 
20 or 30 full-time professionals rather low.
Second in terms of offers, given the MFN (Most Favoured 
Nation) clause, it is rather dangerous to engage in bargaining 
with anybody other than one of the "Big Three" - i.e. EEC,
USA or Japan. To a degree the cure lies in the Third 
World's hands. The 77 or regional groups could put together 
joint professional teams serving more than one country 
to produce joint offers also covering more than one 
country. Once one had two or three regional groupings 
of Third World countries - or a single or aggregated 
Third World team and offer - first there should be no 
particular difficulty getting an adequate number of 
professionals and second an offer that was "large" 
enough that it would be of interest to the Big Three and 
a bargaining position strong enough to lead to dialogue 
not mendicancy.
One area in which something might be achieved turns on the 
fact that most First World countries want trade export
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led expansion. They want this within - at the longest - 
two or three years. If one seeks to spell this out it 
implies export led expansion financed by First World 
countries guaranteeing some type of commercial bank loan 
to peripheral economies. For the industrial economies the 
gain is renewed growth in exports, output, surplus and 
employment. The quid pro quo from the peripheral economy 
point of view is partly whatever investment could be 
maintained from the loan imports but more critical that 
when the period of loan financed exports ended there 
would have to be freer trade access so that the loans 
could be repaid and the enhanced First World exports 
continued.
The type of package sketched many be negotiable simply 
because many First World economies, for rather peculiar 
theological reasons, think that the way to regain growth 
is not by public expenditure but by additional private 
sector production directed to exports. To achieve that 
the practical requirements are that a) peripheral 
economies be able to import something now which apparently 
means guaranteed medium term bank loans and b) unless 
a financial or an industrial economy export crisis is to 
follow immediately by the end of the loan period the 
Third World importers must have additional exports so 
they can service the loan. That a medium term possibility 
does exist along these lines is not negated because the 
aid actually is aid to First World export industries. The 
potential Third World gains turn more on greater access to 
trade than on the loan itself.
♦# - 25 -
Looking still further ahead free trade cannot be the 
whole answer. However, significant progress toward 
globally managed trade expansion within a broad indicative 
planning frame has several preconditions which are not 
met today:
a. the New Protectionism must be contained and turned 
back - genuinely;not by Canute like pronouncements 
datelined from resort beaches;
b. some workable and equitable system of globally 
supervised, limited use of restrictions to meet 
genuine problems of sudden import changes by adjustment 
needs to be created and implemented well enough to 
acquire a degree of core and 77 government confidence;
c. the 77 - and the smaller industrial economies - must 
be confident that either a reformed GATT or a revived 
ITO (International Trade Organisation) gives a 
framework in which they can participate on reasonable 
terms, a view they (quite rightly) do not take of the 
present GATT;
d. the violent suspicions and negative reactions to 
certain Tokyo Round code words "managed free trade", 
"planning", "selectivity", "graduation", "unfair 
competition" must be allowed to fade with the 
passage of time and caused to drop with success in 
an initial process of halting the rise of the New
Protectionism.
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These preconditions all seem to turn on successful short 
term action. That action is largely a tactical defense 
of certain aspects of the GATT free trade system which 
are - whatever their limits - are better than any alternative 
attainable today. It forms the bulk of this presentation 
not because it is more important than longer term proposals 
but because it is both important in itself and a necessary 
(though not sufficient) condition for subsequent changes.
